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Economic Inequality in Kathmandu: A Multi-Indicator
Perspective
Udaya R. Wagle, Ph.D.∗
Studying economic inequality is increasingly important because of its
multidimensional effects on human and societal well-being. This paper examines
economic inequality in Kathmandu using wealth, income, and consumption as its
indicators. Amidst the finding that wealth, income, and consumption have
mutually reinforcing relationships, recent survey data indicate that high income
many not necessarily accumulate into wealth as normally expected. Data also
show that the household and householder characteristics somewhat differ when it
comes to explaining disparities in household wealth, income, and consumption.
The suggestion that spatial segregation, human capital and capability,
inheritance, and household composition are important determinants of economic
inequality—with almost no systematic role for discrimination—provides
enormous implications for policies aimed at curbing economic inequality in
Kathmandu.

Introduction
As its capital city, Kathmandu enjoys the status of major economic and
political power center in Nepal. While recent political developments in the
country have further accelerated this concentration of power, its roots go back to
the formation of Nepal as a nation-state over two and a half centuries ago,
establishing all central government offices in Kathmandu. Together with the
unification of hundreds of desegregated and largely disorganized cliques ruled by
∗
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feudal leaders came the power to draw resources nationally. Kathmandu still
constitutes the core of this largely agrarian nation with several semi-urban
localities serving as its peripheries by catering with the needed agricultural and
other agriculture-based products.
Development of infrastructural facilities that were previously nonexistent
invoked a massive population influx in the 1960s and onwards1 as people started
to relocate to this city for education, business, employment, and other
opportunities. In spite of a lack of hard data, the ongoing political problems with
communist (Maoist) rebellion in much of the rural Nepal claiming thousands of
lives have further escalated its population growth. Since the inception of this
communist rebellion in 1996, and especially since 1999, which was when the
violence and mass killings escalated, people from the countryside have migrated
seeking more secure lives.
The increasing economic activities, particularly after the advent of liberal
economic policies of the 1980s and 1990s, have impressively expanded
opportunities in Kathmandu. Its primarily labor intensive economy thrives only
with the combined efforts of both the rich and the poor, providing the needed
investment as well as skilled and unskilled manpower. During all of the 1990s,
for example, the overall income growth in Kathmandu averaged over five
percent, the rate much higher than in the rest of the country (UNDP/Nepal, 1998,
2002). Although the ongoing political violence has caused massive industrial,
manufacturing, and export slump, retail, construction, and especially real estate
businesses have witnessed a boom, with record highs on real estate prices and
housing construction. People have relocated there, bought parcels of land, and
erected new buildings, thus creating jobs and contributing to the local economy.
These economic and political dynamics offer no more than what typical
areas in the developing world undergo as they urbanize. But its geopolitical
situation with a large native population, persistent political instability, and
massive economic concentration2, despite a slow process of industrialization,
make Kathmandu an interesting venue to study economic inequality. Only in the
1980s and later did this lead city in Nepal feel the wave of economic
liberalization, albeit with considerable setbacks due to enduring political
instability and physically land-locked situation (Pandey, 1999). Slow,
incompetent, and charged with corruption, even the democratically elected
governments of the 1990s were unable to deliver much awaited economic
performance, thus creating a breeding ground for both Maoist causes and causes
of a more authoritarian monarchy3. Implications have been a state with complete
absence of social policies to curb rampant economic polarization in the country.
The more recent wave of migration triggered by the communist rebellion has
further intensified inequality. While some migrate to secure lives and maintain
their economically well-off positions, others flee homes eschewing forced entry
to the rebellion, together with prospect for better opportunities over their current
farm jobs providing means increasingly short of subsistence.
Given a paucity of systematic and focused studies, this paper seeks to
expose the extent of economic inequality in Kathmandu and to identify major
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factors that create and sustain it. While a multitude of factors relate to economic
inequality, it seeks to identify, first, what is the extent of economic inequality as
indicated by wealth, income, and consumption and, second, what explains
differences in households’ economic capacities. Because economic inequality
can be contextual in a major part, depending on social, political, and
demographic structures and systems of intergenerational transfer, this analysis
explores how these contexts dictate economic status of households and what
policy implications can be drawn.
This paper is organized as follows. Next section discusses the concept
and hypotheses. Section C describes the data, with the following section
providing a fresh look into the state of economic inequality in Kathmandu. The
three stage least square models of wealth, income, and consumption and their
results are presented in section E. Section F discusses the findings and the last
section concludes.

Concept and Hypotheses
Studying economic inequality can be a Herculean task because of its
multidimensional nature including inequality in opportunity, talent, education,
earning, income, wealth, consumption, leisure, bequests, and luck (DiazGimenez, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull, 1997). From pragmatic standpoint, however,
it is the wealth, income, and consumption that researchers underscore the most,
as these provide the means, by which people derive a variety of subsequent
means or ends that characterize inequality. Other factors are largely predictable
using these interrelated indicators.
It is one thing to identify the extent of economic inequality as indicated
by wealth, income, and consumption and yet another to ascertain how these
indicators are interrelated. Simplistically, income and wealth are ‘flow’ and
‘stock’ indicators respectively, postulating that income accumulates into wealth
and wealth creates income, forming a self-perpetuating cycle. But in a society, in
which inheritance plays enormous role in occupying wealth that is primarily in
traditional forms including real estates, houses, and other belongings, as opposed
to more modern forms such as business ownership, stock, savings, and talent, one
needs to rethink the thesis that income accumulates into wealth. In spite of
having a fully operational stock market, for example, people avoid investment in
stocks as they seek to expand their physical property base, which they can always
account for. At the same time, however, those without inheritance or without
significant value to transfer as they migrate from the countryside carry high
hopes to accumulate their incomes into wealth. Because physical and immovable
wealth does not necessarily create income, especially when it lacks proper
management, one may be less important than the other. I seek to test whether this
hypothesis of self-perpetuating cycle holds in Kathmandu, suggesting that
income and wealth provide large effects on each other.
Missing in this wealth-income nexus is the consumption as only that part
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of income that is not consumed can accumulate into wealth. While part of wealth
derives from intergenerational transfer, income and consumption essentially enter
the wealth determination calculus. Similarly, although wealth, income, and
consumption all constitute means with which one can acquire economic wellbeing, consumption serves as a conduit towards this end with ability to explain
some of the variation in economic capacity (Wagle, 2005). In the same vein,
people may have consumption, despite a lack of income or wealth, for example,
through family/friends, government transfer, charity, or other relationships
(Pradhan and Ravallion, 2000). A study of economic inequality in terms of the
capacity to acquire economic well-being will be incomplete without including
consumption 4.
Yet the most difficult task in explaining economic inequality is to
identify why people have the level of wealth, income, and consumption they do,
which forms the basis for answering the question of what creates and sustains
inequality. Why do, for example, some households own parcels of land and
multiple buildings where as others have none or are even heavily indebted? In a
different tone, especially when more fluid concept of means is applied, the
question becomes why some households succeed more than others in owning and
operating businesses, commanding large economic resources, or maintaining
higher levels of consumption. Competing explanations exist, with one suggesting
that large households, especially when composed of large number of adult,
working age members, are likely to earn more income, as they have a large pool
of resources or manpower to work with, thus leading to high command over
resources (Wagle, 2004, 2004a; Pradhan and Ravallion, 2000). While it relates to
the capacity of household members and efficient mobilization of household
resources, one plausible hypothesis is to ask if household size and presence of
children can systematically explain economic inequality.
Second, a large body of research focuses on discriminatory practices,
which inhibit groups from being equal citizens, thus creating a wide gulf between
the ‘equals’ and ‘unequals’(Bista, 1991; Darity and Meyers, 1994; Deshpande,
2000; Sen, 1992, 1999; UNDP/Nepal, 1998). The widely held notions of political
and social disenfranchisement of women, Muslims, and lower caste and ethnic
groups in Nepal suggest that a reasonable hypothesis to test includes if the
resulting discrimination serves as a credible source of economic inequality.
Third, human capital or capability theories suggest that economic performance is
a function of one’s degree of preparedness with needed skills, training, and
education (Becker, 1964; Lucas, 1988; Sen, 1992). In a society where seniority,
meritocracy, and occupational choice and capacity influence how one fares
economically, how much these factors contribute to economic inequality
deserves empirical examination.
Fourth, the practice of intergenerational transfer, in which the offspring
share the wealth belonging to their parents once they pass away, is unsurprisingly
extensive in Nepal with, unlike in many western countries, virtually no tax
mechanism to discourage them. While a system of highly uneven playing field
can have multidimensional effects on one’s capability and economic

3

Himalayan Journal of Development and Democracy, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2006
performance, how large a role inheritance plays forms another relevant
hypothesis (Menchik and Jianakoplos, 1997). Finally, urban areas, especially
when composed of large migrant population, form pockets of neighborhoods, in
which residents share common interests or statuses along ethnic, geographic,
economic, or cultural lines (Beall, 1997; Mills and Pernia, 1994; Oberai, 1993).
The core part of the city with Newar ethnicity making up the majority of the
population is quintessential to the immense spatial concentration taking place in
Kathmandu. The last hypothesis to test, therefore, states that spatial segregation
can explain variation in economic performance.
As elsewhere, many other potentially relevant factors contribute to
economic inequality in Kathmandu. It is the epicenter of most high profile
corruption scandals in the country, letting government officials to collect large
sums of unearned money. Government transfer including taxation is another
factor often underscored, as it alters the effective rate of monetary incentives that
people derive from different sources. Remittance by people employed outside of
the country and the treatment of capital gains also form plausible explanations
(Leibbrandt, Woolard, and Woolardt, 2000). A dearth of appropriate data,
however, disallows inclusion of these otherwise highly relevant factors in this
analysis.

Data and Variables
I use data derived from a random survey of 625 households5 conducted
in 2002 and 2003 (Wagle, 2004). The survey gathered data on a variety of
household well-being issues through interviews with householders or other
knowledgeable members on households’ economic, social, and political
dynamics. Sampling involved delineating some 224 geographic clusters out of
the 35 city-wards and, with the help of an Arial map, selecting two to four
households from each cluster depending on its size and population. A group of
eight university students identified the sampled households out of the planned
sample of 672 households and interviewed them using a standardized survey
instrument. In case of failure to interview people from the chosen households, the
interviewers interviewed householders from adjacent houses. A number of
measures were adopted to maintain validity and reliability of the data including a
balanced gender composition of interviewers, appropriate interviewer training,
and standardization of both questions asked and the interview process.
The resulting sample data compared reasonably well to the population
census data collected in 2001. Sample proportions on sex, age group, religion,
region, and type of dwelling, for example, lay within six percent margin around
the population proportions (CBS, 2002; KMC, 2003). Similarly, the sample
average for household size, one of the defining characteristics of population, was
just 0.39 greater than the population average. Although the dataset was fairly
comprehensive, this analysis uses wealth, income, consumption, and other sociodemographic variables where appropriate (see Appendix for definitions and
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coding schemes).
First, household wealth constitutes the net worth of households derived
by adding movable and immovable property and then subtracting any liability.
Household property includes real estate, building, business, motor vehicle, cash,
other liquid assets, and loan receivables, while household liability includes what
the households owe in the form of household or business loans. Second, I
estimate annual household income by aggregating wage, self-employment and
business earnings, house rental, in-cash government transfer6, and remittance and
miscellaneous incomes. While a large part of the household income is derived
from informal sources in Kathmandu, the amount of income used here includes
income from both formal and informal sources. Third, estimates of consumption
are derived by aggregating household expenditures on different kinds of food
items including those consumed at home or outside and on non-food items
including house rental, utilities, health care, clothing, transportation, and
entertainment 7.
Fourth, I use a number of explanatory variables that are useful to test the
five hypotheses posed above. Household composition is represented by
household size and presence of children under 6 where as the concept of
discrimination is captured by caste, ethnicity, religion, percent female among
adults, and having female householders. The concept of human capital or
capability is fairly comprehensive requiring a number of factors to represent it
including householder’s age and average age for adults, householder’s
educational attainment and average educational attainment for adults,
employment status and work place of adults, and occupation and employment
status of householders8. Although finding appropriate indicators of inheritance is
complex (which could ideally be accomplished by asking questions directly), I
use migration status, house title, and permanent dwelling as proxy measures 9. By
the same token, location of households is expected to capture spatial segregation,
with perhaps such other variables as house title and substandard houses
indicating micro level, neighborhood segregation. While I could use either
household or householder characteristics as proxy measures of many household
dimensions, I apply both as and when appropriate with an expectation to provide
more realistic results.

The Extent of Economic Inequality
While economic inequality is essentially a relative measure, a look at some
absolute measures will provide a useful framework for comparison. As Table 1
reports, the average household wealth in Kathmandu was over NRS 2.6 million
in 2002, with per capita wealth of NRS 563,000 whereas the average household
income was NRS 246,000, with per capita annual income of NRS 54,000. This
per capita income appears to be almost triple that for the entire country of NRS
19,50010, almost double the international poverty standard of NRS 28,470, and
almost quadruple the absolute consumption poverty standard of NRS 14,976
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(Wagle, 2004, Forthcoming) 11. The average household wealth was over 10
times the average household income, indicating that the overall savings rate that
might be fundamental to wealth accumulation was relatively low. But while
almost 60 percent of the income appears to have been spent on consumption on
both household and per capita basis, the residual 40 percent estimate does not
automatically apply to savings as households likely to save more are also likely
to spend on other more expensive activities including vacation and education at
home and abroad.
Table 1
Distribution of Wealth, Income, and Consumption at the
Household and Individual level
(N=621)
Variable
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Per Capita
Wealth
562,932
840,121 -161,667 8,373,334
Income
54,001
64,137
3,000
660,000
Consumption
31,885
21,882
3,550
162,100
Household
Wealth
2,596,710 3,867,917 -646,667 41,900,000
Income
246,335
308,762
18,000 3,300,000
Consumption
142,058
108,023
14,900
828,000
Note: All values are in Nepali currency (NRS)

Table 2 provides share of households on the total wealth, income, and
consumption in Kathmandu. The bottom 20 percent of the households occupied
less than one half of a percent of the total wealth, four percent of the total
income, and seven percent of the total consumption, whereas the top 20 percent
scored over 62 percent of the wealth, 55 percent of the income, and 43 percent of
the consumption12. The shares of wealth, income, and consumption for the
bottom 40 percent of the households were slightly over 4, 11, and 17 percent,
compared to 43, 38, and 28 percent respectively for the top 10 percent. These
figures are milder than those found by the 1996 CBS (1997) study, showing the
share of the top 20 percent’s per capita income to be slightly over 50 percent in
Nepal. While it might indicate an improvement in the distribution of income after
1996 (less likely scenario) and/or sampling variation (likely in these types of
studies) 13, I find internal consistency and validity more important than external
convergence with other studies.
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Table 2
Household Share of Total Wealth, Income, and Consumption
Wealth
Income
Consumption
(%)
(%)
(%)
Household Category
Bottom quintile
0.48
3.92
6.55
Next quintile
3.97
7.61
11.40
Next quintile
11.39
12.84
15.93
Next quintile
22.09
20.41
22.24
Top quintile
62.06
55.22
43.88
Top decile
43.66
38.54
27.93

As reported in Table 3, the Gini indices of 0.61, 0.50, and 0.37 for the
distribution of wealth, income, and consumption respectively indicate a moderate
degree of inequality in Kathmandu. But while these estimates appear to be less
persistent than the per capita income and consumption based Gini indices of 0.55
and 0.47 reported in 1996 for the entire country (WIDER, 2005), a direct
comparison is strictly prohibitive because of the contextual, temporal, and
methodological differences. Moreover, the top 10 percent of the households were
over 52 times wealthier, earned over 16 times more income, and consumed eight
times more than those at the bottom 40 percent. The mean wealth, income, and
consumption were 1.73, 1.52, and 1.25 times the median figures respectively,
indicating that the income, consumption, and especially wealth distributions were
highly skewed with a very thin, long upper tail. Coefficient of variation paints
similar picture with income and especially wealth demonstrating twice the
inequality in consumption.
Table 3
Other Measures of Inequality at the Household Level
Inequality Measure
Wealth
Income
Consumption
Gini Index
0.61
0.50
0.37
Ratio of top decile to bottom quintile
181.11
19.67
8.53
Ratio of mean to median
1.73
1.52
1.25
Coefficient of variation
1.49
1.25
0.76
Correlation with wealth
1.00
0.56
0.56
Correlation with income
0.56
1.00
0.72

Apparently, wealth is more highly concentrated than income and both of
which are more concentrated than consumption in Kathmandu. This should not
be surprising, however, given that not all expenditures are included in
consumption, that more resourceful households do not necessarily spend all they
have, and that disparity in income is likely to accumulate into large disparities in
wealth. While no directly comparable estimate is available for Kathmandu, it
may manifest more intense and increasing proclivity of economic inequality than
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does the rest of Nepal. Increasing economic inequality is more common a
problem in urban areas where more economic activities take place, thus
providing more opportunities and economic incentives that can be highly
disparate (Wong, 1995). But the correlation estimate of only 0.56 between
income and wealth suggests a cautionary note that, though somewhat interrelated,
the roots of income and wealth might be different 14. Knowing one’s level of
income, for example, does not necessarily indicate her/his level of wealth and
vice versa. Similarly, whereas income and consumption are equally correlated
with wealth (0.56), correlation of 0.72 between income and consumption adds an
interesting dynamic. While there is no way to determine whether part of
consumption is financed through wealth, correlation coefficients of this relatively
close magnitude serve as a precursor to a complex relationship among the three
indicators of economic inequality.

Models and Results
This complex relationship can be disentangled using an appropriate
regression technique. But the possible endogenity among the three inequality
indicators suggests that a simultaneous model would be more appropriate to
remove any simultaneity bias. I therefore estimate the following simultaneous
system of equations.

W = β 0 + β 1Y + β 2 C + β 3 h + β 4 d + β 5 p + β 6 i + β 7 s + ε 1
Y = γ 0 + γ 1W + γ 2 C + γ 3 h + γ 4 d + γ 5 p + γ 6 i + γ 7 s + ε 2
C = λ 0 + λ1W + λ 2Y + λ3 h + λ 4 d + λ5 p + λ 6 i + λ 7 s + ε 3

Where, W is the wealth; Y is the income; C is the consumption; h, d, P,
i, and s are the vectors of variables relating to household composition,
discrimination, human capital, inheritance, and spatial segregation; β’s, γ’s, and
λ’s are the estimates or vectors of associated coefficients; and ε’s are the
disturbance terms. Incorporation of the three dimensions of economic inequality
in one comprehensive model will be helpful to test hypotheses involving
bidirectional relationships using full, rather than partial, analysis. To obtain the
complete picture of the relationships, I estimate two separate models: the first
focusing on household characteristics and the second focusing on householder
characteristics. While many variables appear in both models, I include additional
household characteristics in the first model including percentage adults female,
mean age for adults, mean educational attainment for adults, and employment
status and workplace of adults. This model is then compared with another model
including such householder characteristics as householder’s gender, age,
education, employment status, and occupation 15.
Results from estimation of the model using three stage least square
procedure reported in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that each model is fairly robust
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with relatively large capacity to explain variation in each of the inequality
indicators. Since the indicators carry large values, their inclusion in natural log
form detected unsurprisingly more consistent relationships. Also notable are the
scales of the coefficients, which though exceedingly small in magnitudes
represent the percent change in the natural log of the indicators being explained
due to a one unit change (i.e., NRS 1) in the explanatory indicator.
Both models overwhelmingly support that wealth, income, and
consumption are highly interrelated, with each being a strong predictor of the
other. Specifically, the models support relevance of the bidirectional
relationships for two of the three possible dyads involving wealth and
consumption in the first case and income and consumption in the second.
Surprisingly, however, both models indicate that this bidirectional nature of
relationship does not apply to the dyad involving wealth and income. At the face
value, contrary to my expectation for income to accumulate into wealth, this last
set of relationships suggests that, while wealth positively interacts with income,
the latter does not do the same with the former.
The model estimates indicate that using household and householder
characteristics provides largely similar outcomes with respect to the determinants
of household wealth, income, and consumption. Particularly consistent are the
determinants of income and consumption, manifesting greater power of the
models to explain variations in household income and consumption16. This issue
of lower degree of predictability of household wealth may be an indication that
possession of large amounts of wealth, whether it is through inheritance or
through accumulation, is more random throughout the population in Kathmandu.
I will take up this issue further in the discussions section to follow but first I
focus on the direction and significance of the coefficient estimates 17.
First, both income models produce positive coefficients on household
size, untouchable caste, age, education, and center location and negative
coefficients on having migrant householders and lacking house title in
determining household wealth. The models do not provide consistent sets of
coefficients supporting the roles of presence of children, gender, employment
status, industry type, occupation, and residential locations other than center when
it comes to explaining variations in household wealth. As presented in Table 4,
the model with household characteristics also detects positive coefficients on
percent adult female and residential locations in the eastern, northern, and
western parts of the city and negative coefficients on presence of children under
six as percent of adults and percent adults employed in registered and in
unregistered businesses. The model including householder characteristics
reported in Table 5 also produces negative coefficients on Muslim religion and
having householders who are unemployed or are in menial labor, machine
operation, or other services occupations.
Second, both models identifying the determinants of household income
estimate consistently positive coefficients on household size, age, self-employed
status especially for those owning registered businesses, and permanent dwelling
and consistently negative coefficients on lacking house title and residential
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locations other than the core part of the city. Other coefficients produced by the
model with household characteristics, however, also include the positive effect of
percent adult female and the negative effects of children under six, percent adults
employed in unregistered businesses, and percent adults unemployed.
Third, results from the two models consistently indicate that variables
positively affecting household consumption include household size, gender, age,
educational attainment, self employed status especially with registered
businesses, and permanent dwelling, with the eastern, northern, and western
locations negatively affecting it. Additionally, the model with household
characteristics detects negative roles of percent employed at unregistered
businesses and absence of house title, whereas the model with householder
characteristics provides negative coefficients on having householder in labor
occupation.

Discussions
Household wealth, income, and consumption are highly interrelated
indicators, with ability to explain most of the economic inequality in a society.
As the models presented here indicate, however, their determinants are largely
different, substantiating their ability to capture somewhat different aspects of
economic inequality. Therefore, only by putting these empirical results in
perspective that we can decipher the nature and basis of economic inequality in
Kathmandu. In what follows, I discuss the model results in light of how
economic inequality is created and sustained in Kathmandu with their policy
implications.

Wealth, Income, and Consumption as Indicators of Economic
Inequality
As summarized in Figure 1, empirical results confirm that the effects of
wealth, income, and consumption on each other are consistently significant and
positive. The effect of income on wealth, however, runs contrary to what is
commonly presumed: statistically insignificant and negative. As surprising as the
insignificance of this effect is its negative sign, which if significant would have
suggested that high income retards wealth. Seemingly an anomaly very difficult
to explain, this may be something idiosyncratic to Kathmandu. But this needs to
be explained by putting the aggregate picture into perspective.
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Figure 1

The Wealth-Income-Consumption Nexus

Consumption

Income

Wealth
As expected, results indicate that income and consumption reinforce each
other even after controlling for the effect of wealth and all other explanatory
variables included. It is logical that households with large incomes are not only
capable to consume more, but they veritably do so in Kathmandu. The other face
of the relationship also indicates that households with large amounts of
consumption expenses can also expect to earn large incomes. Consumption
expenses have values that lead to more healthy, productive lives, which, though
partly embedded in the educational status, might have been reflected in its effects
on household income. In societies where food inadequacy and malnutrition are
prevalent, consumption of nutritionally balanced diet and other necessities is
crucial to avoid unhealthy lifestyle and be successful economically (Satterwaite,
1995; Wagle, 2005). Even following capability arguments, anthropometric
measures which partly constitute the ‘end’ in terms of human well-being further
enable one to achieve more complete set of ‘functioning’ through increased
income and other necessary means (Sen, 1993, 1999). To be more confident with
this explanation, however, one would have to more systematically control for the
effect of health and nutritional status, thus invoking appropriate data.
Results also indicate a mutually reinforcing relationship between wealth
and consumption, even after controlling for the effects of income and other
explanatory variables. The positive effect of wealth on consumption, though not
conspicuous in a society unless supported by data, is absolutely plausible given
that relatively wealthy people can afford to consume more. This is independent
of the effect of wealth on income, which in turn affects consumption, as this
indirect effect would enhance the relationship between wealth and consumption.
The direct effect of wealth on consumption may have mirrored how the former
directly fuels the latter. For many households with high value properties mostly
in real estate, jewelry, or other unproductive form, for example, wealth may fuel
consumption only with its depletion. But the positive effect of consumption on
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wealth is difficult to explain. This along with the result that income does not have
any effect on wealth may be an indication that some people tended to underreport
income and at the same time report consumption more accurately or that part of
their consumptions were financed through wealth. Over 25 percent of the
households, for example, reported consumption in excess of income and these
households also included relatively high-income households. Irrespective of the
explanation offered, however, people with high consumption in Kathmandu
could also expect to possess large amounts of wealth.
Finally, the positive effect of wealth on income is consistent with
expectations as wealth if put to productive use creates income. The case of no
effect of income on wealth, however, invokes explanations similar as those used
for the positive effect of consumption on wealth. Added to underreporting of
income is the suspicion that a large number of households might have
underreported their wealth 18, thereby blurring the relationship between income
and wealth. Because households with large amounts of wealth are not necessarily
the households with large amounts of income, the models were not able to detect
this part of the relationship. This calls for more systematic and accurate data on
both the estimates of income and wealth. Despite considerable data problems,
however, this lack of relationship does have implications on how wealthy
households might have gotten there. Partly it is the deeply rooted inheritance
factor that applies to most households in Nepal. But this finding is above and
beyond the effect of inheritance factor, which is controlled for in the model,
implicating that the dreams of generating wealth through regular income is
difficult to realize in Kathmandu.
While whether a particular government sees any reason to reduce
economic inequality is a separate issue, invoking broader political concerns, the
findings regarding the relationships among the three dimensions of economic
inequality have enormous policy implications. Measures to equalize income,
which are what most governments underscore, might not be adequate to reduce
the overall economic inequality in Kathmandu. In fact, it may be the contrary as
the effects of consumption and especially wealth are more comprehensive with
ability to influence the other two indicators of inequality. Not only is it important
to enable households to consume adequately as it affects the ability to derive
income and wealth. Policies are also needed to equalize wealth distribution
perhaps through more aggressive tax and other government transfer mechanisms
that affect possession of wealth.

Household Composition
Having large households and having large number of children are
generally considered barriers to acquiring high per capita income and wealth. In
Kathmandu, however, data show the former to positively affect per capita
income, since larger size enables households to derive more income, perhaps
detecting the role of extended family households with more productive members
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(Pradhan and Ravallion, 2000; Wagle, 2004a) 19. When it comes to increasing
household wealth, income, and consumption, on the other hand, while large
households are conducive to acquiring high income and consumption, they may
not be equally so to acquiring large amounts of wealth.
The role of having children under six, which was significant only in the
model with household characteristics, is negative on all forms of economic
inequality. The model detecting negative effect of having children on wealth,
income, and consumption may have validated the oft-cited explanations that
parents and especially mothers of young children cannot work. Families with
large number of young children relative to adults suffer from consistently low
levels of wealth, income, and consumption as this disallows working for income
and at the same time lowers consumption as these tend to be young households
with less number of earners and multiple children.
While it was not incorporated in the model, the effect of household size
on different inequality indicators partly depends on the ratio of children under six
to adult members in households. Because less than 30 percent of the households
included children under six and because most of the households with children
included between two and six adult members, interaction between these two
variables needs to be more thoroughly investigated. Although increasing
household size is not an effective policy to advocate, encouraging keeping low
the ratio of children under six to adult members in households may be a viable
policy option especially among young households.

Discrimination
While discrimination can take many forms, this caste-based, patriarchal,
predominantly Hindu society always puts discrimination based on gender, caste,
ethnicity, and religion high on the agenda. Findings, however, appear to be
sketchy at best and inconclusive at worst with important policy implications for
continuation of the current anti-discriminatory policies based on gender, caste,
and religion.
The models suggest that having large percent adult female and having
female householders hold some power to determine household income and
especially consumption, but their positive coefficients run counter to the
discrimination of women in this male-dominated society. It is plausible that the
survey mislabeled a considerable number of households as female-headed,
especially when their income earning, male counterparts were not present in
Kathmandu at the moment of the survey. But the effect of having large numbers
of women among adult members further disproves any economic and social
disenfranchisement of women 20. Because of large remittances from outside,
which these households are likely to receive, however, it does not provide a solid
basis for any form of gender discrimination. This is consistent with complete
absence of the role of gender in determining household wealth.
Findings do not lend support to the widespread belief that upper castes
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economically dominate this Hindu society (Bista, 1991; Deshpande, 2000;
UNDP/Nepal, 1998). Neither is there any evidence for the role of ethnicity in
determining household wealth, income, and consumption. Surprisingly, being
from the lowest caste appears to bless households with large household wealth.
While this might be an indication of a major blow to the deeply rooted castebased discrimination, owing to the recent anti-discriminatory policies including
outright constitutional ban, what is operational may instead be their functional
motivation providing large payoffs21. Nevertheless, their low representation, with
less than one percent of the households in aggregate, along with no evidence of
higher household income and consumption, disallows any conclusive claim.
Moreover, the expectation that Hindu religion would serve as a basis for
economic inequality does not appear to be credible. Whereas one model suggests
being from Muslim religion to be important to predict household wealth, this
negative effect appears to be confined only to this indicator perhaps underscoring
that these households tend to be migrant households with low levels of
accumulated wealth. More important than this, which can be explained just like
the case of migrant householders and residential location (see below), is the fact
that society lacks systematic discrimination against Muslims especially in income
and consumption.

Human Capital and Capability
Given the seniority based reward system in Nepal, the finding that age
and economic resources are positively related is useful for policymakers seeking
to introduce measures that facilitate transition to meritocratic reward system.
While income might decline as one grows older, which explains why the squared
form of age variable works best in most econometric models22, findings from
these models perhaps highlight two important issues. One, although one becomes
unable to hold a job as s/he grows older, strong social insurance system with
younger members taking on productive activities renders continuation to the
capacity of the household to earn high income and maintain high level of
consumption. Next, increasing economic resources that can be derived with
increase in age allows one to build adequate safety nets in the form of wealth and
eligibility to receive regular pensions—the latter in case of government and semigovernment retirees.
The models also detect the role of occupational and employment
characteristics of householders and households in determining economic
inequality. While households with large percent of adults employed in highly
volatile unregistered businesses fare consistently worse on all three indicators,
other occupational and employment characteristics do not have highly consistent
roles. Despite their comparable incomes and consumption, for example,
households with self-employed householders and with large percent of adults
self-employed with registered businesses own less wealth. Having householders
who are in such low profile jobs as menial labor, machine operation, and other
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services, though not necessarily low paid and low consumption other than in case
of labor occupation, disallows households to possess large amounts of wealth.
Also interesting is the finding that households with large percent of adults
employed in registered businesses and unemployed householders, although not
necessarily low earners or consumers as they tend to be young in age tend to
possess less wealth. Households with large percent of adults unemployed, on the
other hand, tend to earn less despite having comparable wealth and consumption,
perhaps because of their old age. Particularly surprising was the finding that
occupation of householders did not provide any effect of more rewarding
executive and professional occupation and that of less rewarding menial labor
and machine operation occupations—the latter in case of income only.
Consistent with the view that educated, skilled, and well-prepared people
can do better in every sphere, thereby making more informed decisions (Becker,
1964; Lucas, 1988; Sen, 1992; Wagle, 2002, 2005), households associated with
educated householders or members overall tend to hold higher wealth, income,
and consumption23. This is no surprise, with the ability of wealth, income, and
consumption to explain each other, that more of all three is concentrated in the
hands of the more educated, as they hold the skills and information necessary to
make decisions that lead to, inter alia, large economic payoffs. Though obvious,
this provides a compelling evidence for policymakers being confronted with
views that education cannot reverse increasing economic inequality.

Inheritance
Consistent with the findings elsewhere (Menchik and Jianakoplos, 1997),
the models offer a compelling case for the effect of inheritance on wealth,
income, and consumption. There is clear demarcation in terms of household
wealth between households with native-born householders that are assumed to
inherit high value property 24 and those with migrant householders that lack it.
When it comes to determining income and consumption, on the other hand, there
is no such cleavage indicating that migrant households are worse off wealth-wise
because of differences in inheritance and not because of their abilities to earn
income and consume.
The role of inheritance is further captured in the status of houses. The
role of permanent dwelling that may be a sign of better economic position today
is consistently better in terms of consumption and income and not that of wealth.
It appears that those residing in permanent dwelling can expect to earn more
income and consume more but it is not because they have large amounts of
wealth. While those with permanent dwellings ideally possess large values of
wealth, this does not apply to the entire group, which includes among others
those that are renting apartments in such dwellings and therefore may lack highvalue properties to own. In terms of those lacking house title, on the other hand,
results are largely consistent that they fare worse on all three indicators. This
finding is coherent with what one would normally expect as those residing in
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such dwellings are there because they do not own high value properties, neither
do they earn high income or are able to consume well. A disproportionately large
group (80 percent) of those lacking house title were also migrant households
signifying their inability to inherit much wealth.
Inheritance plays a dominant role in Nepal, with rich parents bestowing
large amounts of wealth to their sons who are entitled to them by social contract.
Since the model estimates substantiate a strong relationship among wealth,
income, and consumption, the effect of wealth inheritance further extends to the
ability to derive high values of income and consumption. While results paint a
picture with relatively large effect of inheritance on determining consumption,
income, and especially wealth, limited policy options are available for the
government to discourage inheritance due to its highly institutionalized tradition
of intergenerational transfer. Nonetheless, reforming tax structures especially
targeted at inherited property with a strong government transfer mechanism
would be effective to discourage such inheritance.

Spatial Segregation
Findings overwhelmingly support the relevance of spatial segregation in
determining inequality. This role of location can be justified using the notion of
highly segregated neighborhoods that have had a history of only two to three
decades. Since people and especially migrants tend to settle in places where they
find others with similar economic, social, and other backgrounds, the spatial face
of economic inequality that has been suggested elsewhere is equally applicable in
Kathmandu (Beall, 1997; Mills and Pernia, 1994; Oberai, 1993, Wilson, 1996).
At the same time, however, the highly dense, historically wellestablished core location appears to inhabit people who have large household
income and consumption and yet comparable amounts of household wealth.
Comparable or even lower amounts of wealth in the core location are at odds
when households have capacities to score significantly higher on income and
consumption. Especially troubling is the finding that the core part of the city
could expect significantly lower household wealth than north, west, and
especially center location after controlling for all other variables, whereas as
Table 6 shows its second position with average household wealth that is slightly
lower than in the north location and considerably higher in all other locations.
Real estate and housing prices are relatively higher in the core part but the
population itself is highly dense leading to lower values for typical households to
own. However, the findings might have also indicated a fundamental shift from
this core part to other more emerging parts with skyrocketing real estate and
housing prices.

16

Himalayan Journal of Development and Democracy, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2006
Table 6
Average Wealth, Income, and Consumption in the Five Macro Locations in Kathmandu
Locations
Description
Core
Central
East
North
West
Household wealth
2,816,896
1,974,587
2,311,312
3,157,453
2,958,314
(2,660,012) (4,731,307) (3,664,794) (3,842,067) (4,514,099)
Household Income
421,620
176,815
174,018
254,977
259,259
(415,394)
(186,990)
(173,370)
(338,401)
(373,956)
Household consumption
206,938
117,806
123,814
138,572
133,514
(129,717)
(61,116)
(97,421)
(95,118)
(124,199)
Note: Values in parentheses represent standard deviations.

The suggestion that households from all other parts of the city can expect
to have lower income and consumption than those from the core part is
interesting but highly consistent with the data (Table 6). Households from the
core part are able to earn and consume more, despite having lower values of
wealth, perhaps by putting their assets to more productive use. Alternatively,
despite owning comparable or even higher value properties households from
other parts may not look for ways to invest them to maximize returns.
Apparently, missing from the picture are the qualitative differences among
households from the central, eastern, northern, and western parts of the city as the
models only detected their difference with the core part as the reference category
25
.
Additionally, the role of micro-level neighborhood segregation especially
in terms of those residing in illegal and temporary settlements, which often
include sub-standard houses, is substantiated with the negative roles of both
temporary dwelling (the opposite of permanent dwelling) and lack of house title
in holding large value of wealth, income, and consumption. This form of spatial
segregation is perhaps more important from policy standpoint as it includes more
homogenous population, compared with broader divisions discussed above. The
models clearly reaffirm that these illegal or squatter settlements, which lack basic
social services as well as political rights to ask for them, are particularly prone to
economic inequality and thus need to be the focus of public policies. These
settlements are also likely to inhabit people with lower sets of inherited property
and with lower endowments of human capital including health, education, and
skill thus leading to lower capabilities to score income and consumption.

Conclusion
There are strong suggestions that economic inequality confers
detrimental effects on multiple dimensions of human lives. Since it causes
concentration of economic resources, it leaves a large percentage of the
population deprived of the command over resources, thus disallowing them to
have a life-style that is considered decent especially from the relative poverty
standpoint (Wagle, 2002, Forthcoming). Because those lacking resources are
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unable to meet adequate consumption of even basic necessities, its pronounced
effects fall on health, education, productivity, and overall economic well-being.
Additionally, those lacking adequate economic resources cannot fully participate
in those social, cultural, and political activities that are embedded in the modern
concept of human well-being (Townsend, 1993). As a recent APSA Task Force
Report (2004) argued, for example, economic inequality creates unequal voices
in democratic systems with deleterious effects on who gets what from policies. It
is even more critical in developing countries like Nepal, where politics is a game
only a few minority members play, with the mass population largely detached
from the political process (Bista, 1991) and the fragile democracy cannot be
stabilized without adequate participation from citizens.
This analysis found that the three key indicators of inequality including
wealth, income, and consumption have mutually reinforcing relationships thus
playing important roles in creating and sustaining economic inequality in this
capital city of Nepal. Income does not appear to contribute directly to wealth
creation, perhaps reaffirming the traditional, inheritance-driven approach to
acquiring wealth. But possible measurement errors and its direct effects on
consumption and indirect effects on wealth indicate that income may still have
some power to drive disparities in wealth. The suggestion, therefore, is that the
focus of policymakers seeking to curb economic inequality in Kathmandu and
perhaps in Nepal ought to be on the distribution of all three dimensions.
Despite this largely mutually reinforcing relationship, however, the bases
of inequality in household consumption, income, and especially wealth appear to
be somewhat different. Admittedly, many of the factors contributing to inequality
in wealth, income, and consumption are uniform; the effects of educational
attainment, age, household size, children under six, percent adults employed in
unregistered businesses, and a lack of house title were consistent. Surprisingly,
the effect of residential location being other than the core part of the city was
opposite in sign between wealth on one side and income and consumption on the
other. Moreover, the effects of many variables differed in significance among the
three dimensions of inequality, indicating, for example, that the households with
high income are not necessarily the households with high wealth and
consumption.
Findings further suggested that spatial segregation would rank
consistently high as the strongest determinant of economic inequality in
Kathmandu. This is highly plausible given the regional variability in economic
conditions of households with more homogenous households concentrating in
certain neighborhoods. Human capital and capability form another broader issue
with considerable power to explain inequality. This is because of the role of age
and educational attainment, both important in this developing society, trying to
leap from its highly imbedded seniority culture to more modern meritocracic
culture.
Inheritance has its own role in this society with long history of extended
family and agrarian practice, in which the offspring, and especially sons, share
the property of their parents once they pass way. Although the more modern

18

Himalayan Journal of Development and Democracy, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2006
concept of wealth accumulation especially in the form of liquid assets and
movable and intangible property is anecdotally replacing the system of
intergenerational transfer, even this most modern, urban center in the country is
yet to witness full transition. Household composition including household size
and presence of children are important in terms of a household’s capacity to earn
income, accumulate wealth, and consume adequately. Finally, while
contradictory to the dominant views, this analysis does not find discrimination as
a potential source of economic inequality in Kathmandu. Gender, Muslim
religion, and untouchable caste that demonstrate some association do not
sufficiently warrant consistent effects.
Future studies need to focus on the horizontal and longitudinal expansion
of this concept to derive more general findings. Horizontal expansion is needed
to uncover the trend in other parts of Nepal so that these findings can be verified.
Longitudinal expansion, on the other hand, would be useful to look at the
historical trend in economic inequality in Kathmandu, thus identifying how these
different sources of inequality play out over time. Also needed are
comprehensive studies of inequality with more accurate data so that the findings
would not suffer from measurement errors.

Notes
1.

Kathmandu, where this analysis focuses, recorded a 4.53 percent annual population
growth in the 1990s with 672,000 inhabitants in 2001 (KMC, 2002). It is notable that
Kathmandu is the largest and perhaps the fastest growing of the four cities and
towns—including Lalitpur, Bhaktapur, and Kirtipus—in the Kathmandu Valley.

2.

A report by UNDP/Nepal (1998) shows, for example, that the per capita household
income of the top 10 percent in urban Nepal including Kathmandu increased from
close to 20 percent in 1985 to about 70 percent in 1996.

3.

The country currently has government officials appointed by the monarch, with
election long overdue for all units of government and thus virtually no elected
political representatives.

4.

The assumption is that consumption, expressed mostly—but not necessarily—in
monetary terms, captures what is needed to maintain a healthy lifestyle. In reality,
however, increasing levels of consumption may not lead to more healthy lifestyles,
as higher expenditures may be devoted to taste and quality of items consumed.

5.

Out of these households, however, only 621 had income and wealth data, thus
making it the effective sample size for the extent of economic inequality. In case of
the ensuing analysis, however, the sample size further diminishes, depending on the
missing values on some of the explanatory variables.

6.

In-kind government transfers that are often included in studies of economic
inequality are not included here. In a country, where social services including
education and health care are available from public agencies, it is difficult to
estimate the value of services received by households.
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7.

While what expenditures are included in consumption is debatable, more important
in studying economic inequality in a particular society is the consistency across
households.

8.

While I could use workplace and occupation of both householders and all adults, I
use workplace of adults and occupation of householders to capture the general
effects of both factors.

9.

Since the real estate and housing prices are generally higher in Kathmandu than in
other parts of the country, migration status indicates that the property inherited by
migrants would not be as expensive as those inherited by the native-born population.
Additionally, I assume that those with large inherited property would not lack title to
their houses and/or reside in substandard dwellings.

10. This is based on the US$250 estimate reported by the World Bank (2003) for
2002/2003 using the nominal exchange rate of US$1=NRS 78 that prevailed at the
end of 2002, the actual time of the survey. One could, however, come up with
different US$ estimates using purchasing power parity rate of conversion.
11. This does not apply to real economic welfare or well-being since the cost of living in
Kathmandu is much higher.
12. Here I focus on household rather than on per capita figures. While the latter figures
are also important, the former are more appropriate to examine economic inequality,
for households comprise young and old as well as productive and unproductive
members, who enjoy the same command over resources. The economic welfare of
different members within a household tends to be similar, suggesting that the unit of
analysis needs to be the ‘household.’ This is true unless there are other ways to
account for intra-household differences in welfare, which this analysis does not
cover.
13. Especially noteworthy was the timing of this survey, in which a general sense of
distrust over outsiders loomed large in Kathmandu owing to the ongoing communist
rebellion as well as government’s anti-corruption initiatives targeting high profile
political representatives and government officials. Underreporting of income and
wealth might have occurred, perhaps attenuating both their estimates for those at the
high end of the distribution and the overall magnitude of inequality.
14. It is interesting, however, that this correlation is much higher than those found in
industrial countries. In the United States, for example, the correlation between
income and wealth is just 0.321 (Diaz-Gimenez et al, 1997).
15. This practice of estimating separate models including household and householder
characteristics is not common. But wide disparities that are likely in Nepal among
household members on education, employment, occupation, and the like indicate that
using only one set of characteristics does not capture the full range of issues. Recent
changes producing very productive household members, whereas the householders
constitute less educated, unskilled parents in this society with extended families,
make a compelling case that householder characteristics do not necessarily predict
household status and performance and vice versa.
16. This is also conspicuous from large R2 estimates. As Tables 4 and 5 indicate, for
example, R2 estimates are considerably higher for the income and consumption
dimensions.
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17. I use the negative or positive signs of coefficients to indicate the nature of effects,
with their underlying significance. Unless otherwise indicated, the nature of effects
provided will imply that the effects are statistically significant at 95 percent
confidence level. Moreover, guided by a motivation to explain the general bases of
economic inequality in Kathmandu, I do not focus on the absolute magnitudes of the
coefficients and their interpretations. Because the dependent variables enter in the
model in their natural log form, however, absolute values of the model coefficients
would require careful interpretations. The coefficient of 0.109 on household size for
income shown in Table 4, for example, indicates that increasing household size by
one point (or person) would lead to 10.9 percent increase in income. In case of
dummy variables such as center location, on the other hand, the coefficient of –0.374
indicates that household residence in that location would make it 37.4 percent worse
off in income.
18. It is not unexpected due to the timing of the survey as discussed in note 13. As a
simple check, for example, results indicate that over 12 percent of the householders
reported their income and/or wealth to be less than their consumption. While some
households may get heavily indebted, this anomaly for a large number of households
hinges on a more systematic problem.
19. A correlation coefficient of 0.83 between household size and the number of adult
members, for example, supports that large households indeed tend to include more
productive members even after accounting for those who are old and thus may not be
as economically active.
20. Acharya, Mathema, and Acharya (1999), for example, find similar empirical results
and admit that ‘feminization of poverty’ which is real in Nepal is hard to prove with
household level data. The argument relates to intra-household disparities between
men and women, leading to similar resources and yet dissimilar levels of individual
welfare.
21. Many of these households from the untouchable caste, for example, owned tailor
shops, one of the highly lucrative skill-intensive businesses in the city.
22. It is interesting to note that the squared form of age that almost always works well in
econometric models did not turn out to be so in this analysis.
23. Using human capital theories to justify inequality in income is almost outdated now.
But in a society where traditional forms of assets still dominate with large role of
inherited property and very little investment in human capital, these theories do not
necessarily provide the best explanation.
24. Having native-born householder does not necessarily imply that households have
inherited property. But given the structural changes in Kathmandu with more recent
influx of population, the assumption that native-born householders are more
established with perhaps real estate and other high value properties is realistic.
25. While the coefficient magnitudes may indicate such differences, they are difficult to
compare across dimensions and across models and therefore are not included in this
analysis.
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Variable
Inequality Variables
Household income (NRS)

Continuous

Household Wealth (NRS)

Continuous

Household consumption (NRS)

Continuous

Household characteristics:
Household size
Children under 6 as % of adults
% adult females
Average age for adults
No house title
Permanent dwelling
Average education for adults
Employment and Work place:
% adults employed in government agencies
% adults employed in NGOs
% adults employed in public enterprises
% adults employed in private companies
% adults employed in registered businesses
% adults employed in unregistered businesses
% adults self employed with registered businesses
% adults self employed with unregistered businesses
% adults unemployed
Householder characteristics:
Female
Age
Marital status: Married
Marital status: Unmarried
Marital status: Widow
Caste: Brahmin
Caste: Chhetri
Caste: Untouchable
Caste: Baishya
Ethnicity: Newar
Ethnicity: Magar
Ethnicity: Gurung
Ethnicity: Rai
Ethnicity: Tamang
ethnicity: Other
Religion: Hindu
Religion: Buddhist
Religion: Muslim
Religion: Other
Migrant
Educational attainment
Householder's occupation and employment:
Armed forces
Farming
Labor
Machine operation
Craft
Sales
Administrative support
Executive and professional
Other services
Unemployed
Self employed
Location:
Core
Center
East
North
West

Type

Appendix
Description of Variables
Value

Definition

3k to 660k

Total household income including wages, self-employment and business earnings, house
rental, in-cash government transfer, and remittance and miscellaneous income
-647k to
Household net worth including value of real estate, building, business, motor vehicle,
41900k
cash, other liquid assets, and loan receivables, less any loans
15k to 828k Total household expenditures on consumption including of food items consumed at
home or outside and such non-food items as house rental, transportation, utilities,
clothing, health care, and entertainment

Dichotomous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Continuous

0 and 1
0 to 1
0 to 1
19 to 62
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 to 18

Household size including children
Children under 6 as percentage of all adult members
Adult females as percentage of all adults 18 and over
Average age for all adults 18 and over
Households lacking title to the house they own
Residence in permanent versus substandard dwelling
Average educational attainment in years for all adults 18 and over

Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous

0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to 1

Percent adult members employed in government agencies
Percent adult members employed in nongovernment organizations
Percent adult members employed in government owned public enterprises
Percent adult members employed in private companies
Percent adult members employed in registered businesses
Percent adult members employed in unregistered businesses
Percent adult members self-employed with registered businesses
Percent adult members self-employed with unregistered businesses
Percent adult members employed

Dichotomous
Continuous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Continuous

0 and 1
19 to 86
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 to 22

Household's in which householder is female
Householder's age
Households in which householder's marital status is married
Households in which householder's marital status is unmarried
Households in which householder's marital status is widow
Households in which householder is from Brahmin caste
Households in which householder is from Chhetri caste
Households in which householder is from Untouchable caste
Household in which householder is from Baishya caste including different ethnicities
Households in which householder is from Newar ethnicity
Households in which householder is from Magar ethnicity
Households in which householder is from Gurung ethnicity
Households in which householder is from Rai ethnicity
Households in which householder is from Tamang ethnicity
Households in which householder is from other ethnicity within Baishya caste
Households in which householder is Hindu
Households in which householder is Buddhist
Households in which householder is Muslim
Households in which householder follows other religions
Households in which householder immigrated from other places
Educational attainment of householder in years

Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous

0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1

Householder in armed forces occupation
Householder in farming occupation
Householder in unskilled labor occupation
Householder in machine operation including driving occupation
Householder in craft occupation
Householder in sales occupation
Householder in administrative support occupation
Householder in executive and professional occupation
Householder in other services occupation
Householder unemployed
Householder self employed

Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous

0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1
0 and 1

Residential location in the Core Sector of the city
Residential location in the Center Sector of the city
Residential location in the East Sector of the city
Residential location in the North Sector of the city
Residential location in the West Sector of the city
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Table 4
Three Stage Least Square Model of Household Wealth, Income, and Consumption
Using Household Characteristics
Wealth
Income
Consumption
Variables
Household wealth
2.62E-08 **
2.71E-08 **
(6.81E-09)
(5.59E-09)
Household income
-2.22E-07
5.60E-07 **
(3.95E-07)
(7.12E-08)
Household consumption
3.40E-06 **
3.43E-06 **
(1.24E-06)
(2.72E-02)
Household Composition
Household size
0.116 *
0.055 **
0.088 **
(0.047)
(0.011)
(0.009)
Childrenn under 6 as % of adults
-1.386 **
-0.246 *
-0.211 *
(0.447)
(0.109)
(0.087)
Discrimination
Chhetri caste
-0.171
-0.041
-0.033
(0.235)
(0.057)
(0.046)
Newar ethnicity
0.016
0.016
0.011
(0.265)
(0.064)
(0.052)
Magar ethnicity
-0.208
0.075
-0.077
(0.529)
(0.128)
(0.103)
Gurung ethnicity
0.392
0.114
0.052
(0.538)
(0.130)
(0.105)
Rai ethnicity
0.440
0.092
-0.130
(0.576)
(0.140)
(0.112)
Tamang ethnicity
0.333
-0.105
0.034
(0.495)
(0.120)
(0.097)
Untouchable caste
2.813 **
0.123
0.135
(0.982)
(0.238)
(0.192)
Buddhist religion
-0.288
0.039
0.028
(0.267)
(0.065)
(0.052)
Muslim religion
-1.279
0.208
0.270
(0.747)
(0.181)
(0.146)
% adult female
0.549
0.400 **
0.241 *
(0.496)
(0.120)
(0.097)
Human Capital
Mean age for adults
0.050 **
0.012 **
0.006 **
(0.012)
(0.003)
(0.002)
Mean educational attainment for adults
0.208 **
0.040 **
0.044 **
(0.028)
(0.007)
(0.005)
-0.449
-0.106
0.028
% adults employed in government agencies
(0.597)
(0.145)
(0.117)
-1.003
0.246
-0.156
% adults employed in NGOs
(0.966)
(0.234)
(0.189)
0.069
-0.337
0.039
% adults employed in public enterprises
(1.178)
(0.285)
(0.230)
-0.728
-0.102
-0.134
% adults employed in private companies
(0.540)
(0.131)
(0.105)
-1.661 *
-0.284
-0.194
% adults employed in registered businesses
(0.687)
(0.167)
(0.134)
-1.337 *
-0.377 *
-0.448 **
% adults employed in unregistered businesses
(0.683)
(0.166)
(0.133)
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% adults self employed with registered businesses
% adults self employed with unregistered businesses
% adults unemployed

Inheritance
Householder migrant
Permanent dwelling
No house title

Spatial Segregation
Center location
East location
North location
West location
Constant (in natural log)

N
R-squared
Note : Values in parentheses are standard errors
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
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0.539
(0.510)
-0.198
(0.415)
-0.573
(0.397)

0.390 **
(0.124)
-0.128
(0.101)
-0.226 *
(0.096)

0.272 **
(0.099)
-0.032
(0.081)
-0.011
(0.077)

-1.310 **
(0.219)
0.395
(0.263)
-2.884 **
(0.522)

-0.023
(0.054)
0.222 **
(0.064)
-0.423 **
(0.126)

0.054
(0.043)
0.159 **
(0.051)
-0.173
(0.102)

0.980
(0.343)
0.393
(0.297)
0.637
(0.325)
0.647
(0.325)
9.424
(0.761)
619
0.439

-0.226
(0.084)
-0.379
(0.072)
-0.236
(0.080)
-0.226
(0.080)
10.399
(0.186)
619
0.694

-0.097
(0.067)
-0.207 **
(0.059)
-0.171
(0.065)
-0.283 **
(0.064)
10.343 **
(0.150)
619
0.63

**

*
*
*

**
**
**
**
**
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Table 5
Three Stage Least Square Model of Household Wealth, Income, and Consumption
Using Householder Characteristics
Wealth
Income
Consumption
Variables
Household Wealth
3.17E-08 **
3.17E-08 **
(6.98E-09)
(5.63E-09)
Household Income
-3.95E-08
5.72E-07 **
(3.91E-07)
(7.18E-08)
Household Consumption
4.19E-06 **
3.59E-06 **
(1.22E-07)
(2.79E-07)
Household Composition
Household size
0.067
0.051 **
0.086 **
(0.049)
(0.012)
(0.009)
Childrenn under 6 as % of adults
-0.811
-0.043
-0.100
(0.421)
(0.106)
(0.084)
Discrimination
Chhetri caste
-0.115
-0.021
-0.016
(0.229)
(0.058)
(0.046)
Newar ethnicity
0.140
0.046
0.024
(0.264)
(0.067)
(0.053)
Magar ethnicity
-0.446
-0.012
-0.118
(0.529)
(0.133)
(0.105)
Gurung ethnicity
0.446
0.166
0.017
(0.533)
(0.134)
(0.106)
Rai ethnicity
0.435
0.067
-0.120
(0.571)
(0.144)
(0.114)
Tamang ethnicity
0.602
-0.084
0.077
(0.492)
(0.124)
(0.098)
Untouchable caste
2.840 **
0.146
0.299
(1.004)
(0.253)
(0.200)
Buddhist religion
-0.326
0.047
0.017
(0.264)
(0.066)
(0.053)
Muslim religion
-1.913 **
-0.006
0.149
(0.730)
(0.184)
(0.145)
Householder female
-0.300
0.136
0.164 **
(0.298)
(0.075)
(0.059)
Human Capital
Householder's age

0.026
(0.008)
0.144
(0.023)
-0.422
(0.508)
0.437
(0.643)
-0.895
(0.426)
-1.796
(0.488)
-0.929
(0.468)
0.191
(0.653)

Householder's Educational attainment
Householder's occupation: Armed forces
Householder's occupation: Farming
Householder's occupation: Other services
Householder's occupation: Labor
Householder's occupation: Machine operation
Householder's occupation: Craft
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**
**

*
**
*

0.006 **
(0.002)
0.028 **
(0.006)
-0.092
(0.128)
-0.032
(0.162)
-0.154
(0.108)
-0.148
(0.123)
0.085
(0.118)
-0.001
(0.165)

0.005 **
(0.002)
0.032 **
(0.004)
-0.165
(0.101)
-0.121
(0.128)
-0.112
(0.085)
-0.450 **
(0.097)
-0.024
(0.093)
-0.254
(0.130)
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Householder's occupation: Sales

Householder's occupation: Administrative support
Householder's occupation: Executive and professional
Householder unemployed
Householder self employed
Inheritance
Householder Migrant
Permanent dwelling
No house title
Spatial segregation
Center location
East location
North location
West location

Constant (in natural log)
N
R-squared
Note : Values in parentheses are standard errors
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

29

-0.416
(0.387)
-0.102
(0.407)
-0.283
(0.310)
-1.000 *
(0.422)
0.308
(0.234)

-0.027
(0.098)
-0.026
(0.103)
0.082
(0.078)
-0.025
(0.106)
0.138 *
(0.059)

-0.060
(0.077)
-0.107
(0.081)
-0.041
(0.062)
-0.018
(0.084)
0.119 **
(0.047)

-1.394 **
(0.219)
0.294
(0.260)
-2.615 **
(0.525)

-0.034
(0.056)
0.242 **
(0.065)
-0.423 **
(0.132)

0.048
(0.044)
0.158 **
(0.052)
-0.133
(0.105)

0.785 *
(0.334)
0.362
(0.287)
0.435
(0.312)
0.491
(0.319)
10.961 **
(0.671)
619
0.444

-0.327
(0.084)
-0.467
(0.073)
-0.344
(0.080)
-0.299
(0.081)
10.687
(0.170)
619
0.675

-0.159
(0.067)
-0.255
(0.058)
-0.219
(0.063)
-0.324
(0.064)
10.577
(0.135)
619
0.625

**
**
**
**
**

*
**
**
**
**

